Efficiency measurement in network industries: application to the Swiss railway companies by Farsi, Mehdi et al.
 1
EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES: 
APPLICATION TO THE SWISS RAILWAY COMPANIES∗ 
 
Mehdi Farsi 
Center for Energy Policy and Economics, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
and Department of Economics, University of Lugano 
ETH Zentrum, WEC, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland 
mfarsi@ethz.ch 
 
Massimo Filippini 
Center for Energy Policy and Economics, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
and Department of Economics, University of Lugano 
ETH Zentrum, WEC, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland 
mfilippini@ethz.ch 
 
William Greene 
Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University 
44 West 4th St., New York, NY 10012, USA 
wgreene@stern.nyu.edu 
ABSTRACT 
 
The persistence of increasingly high government subsidies in Switzerland’s railroads 
has led the federal and cantonal authorities to discussing the possibility of high-powered 
incentive contracts such as those based on cost efficiency benchmarking. Railways are 
however, characterized by a high degree of unobserved heterogeneity that could bias the 
efficiency estimates. This paper examines the performance of several panel data models to 
measure cost efficiency in network industries. The unobserved firm-specific effects and the 
resulting biases are studied through a comparative study of several stochastic frontier models, 
applied to a panel of 50 railway companies operating over a 13-year period.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The railroad system in Switzerland consists of two sectors. The first sector includes the 
international and inter-regional transports. This sector is monopolized by the Swiss Federal 
Railways, which operates more than half of the railway networks in Switzerland. The second 
sector provides regional and local transport services that account for about a third of 
Switzerland’s railway passengers. Today, this sector consists of 49 Regional Railway 
Companies (RRC) with an average network length of approximately 40 kilometers.1 In 
general the main function of an RRC is to link a rural region to the intercity railway network 
or to an urban transport network.  
The RRCs operate with a regional monopoly license given by the Confederation.2 This 
license defines the RRC’s responsibilities, which imply an obligation to provide regular 
services according to a fixed time table and to apply the official tariff scheme. Moreover, the 
RRC receives subsidies for their deficit in operating costs and the infrastructure investments 
from the Confederation and the corresponding canton. 
In 1996, following an alarming growth in government subsidies for railway transport in 
Switzerland, the federal government introduced a series of regulatory reforms.3 In particular, 
the subsidization of RRCs that was previously based on full coverage of deficits has been 
replaced by an ex-ante fixed payment system. The federal and cantonal governments 
commission the transport companies for services on the basis of an estimated compensation 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
∗ The authors wish to thank Michael Crew and two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions. Aurelio 
Fetz provided an excellent assistance, which is gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are the 
responsibility of the authors.   
1 The regional railways are owned by different Swiss governments (Confederation, cantons and municipalities) 
and by some private investors. However, the share of private ownership is low.  
2 Switzerland is a confederation composed of 26 cantons and approximately 3000 municipalities. Each canton 
has a high degree of autonomy in the organization, planning and regulation of the local public transport. 
3 In 1995 the Swiss parliament approved the revision of the Railway Act (1995) which came into effect as of 
January 1, 1996. Moreover, in 1999, following the changes in the transport policy at the European level ( EC 
Directive 91/440), further measures have been introduced. These measures include reinforcement of the fixed 
payment system; separation of infrastructure and transport services in terms of organization and accounting; and 
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defined in advance to cover the planned costs, which are not otherwise covered. In addition, 
the new regulations provide the possibility of competitive tendering for assigning the licenses, 
whereby the most performing railway companies would be incited to offer the transport 
service satisfying the conditions imposed by the cantonal regulator. However, tendering is an 
optional measure and has not been used in any cantons to date.  
Although the ex-ante fixed payment rule represents an improvement with respect to 
previous subsidization practices, without a benchmarking analysis it does not contain 
incentives to minimize costs. Given that these subsidies are determined through a long series 
of negotiations and bargaining between railway companies and the corresponding cantonal 
governments, companies might use their local monopoly power to maintain high subsidies. 
Therefore, in the last years some cantonal authorities have begun to use simple benchmarking 
analysis of costs to determine the level of subsidies. The federal and cantonal authorities have 
been discussing the possibility to adopt high-powered incentive contracts based on yardstick 
competition model proposed by Shleifer (1985).4 In this context cost frontier models could be 
useful as a benchmarking tool to induce efficiency but also as a complementary control 
instrument to determine the amount of subsidies granted to the RRCs. A similar approach has 
been used in the regulation of water supply in Italy, where a yardstick competition model 
based on cost estimation has been applied (Antonioli and Filippini 2001).  
A number of studies such as Cantos and Maudos (2001), Coelli and Perelman (2000) 
and Gathon and Perelman (1992) have explored the application of frontier models in railways. 
However, only a few papers have adopted a stochastic frontier approach.5 Railway networks 
are characterized by a high level of output heterogeneity. Networks with different shapes and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
provision of open network access in freight transport. The latter does not apply to regional railways, which 
mainly provide short-distance passenger services. 
4 For a discussion of this issue see Tromp (2003) and Federal Office of Transport (2003). See also Dalen and 
Gòmez-Lobo (2003) for an application of yardstick competition in another transport sector namely, bus industry. 
5 See Oum et al. (1999) for a survey of this literature.  
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densities have different organization and coordination problems, thus different costs. 
Furthermore, environmental characteristics such as topography and climate can influence the 
operating costs. In many cases, the information is not available for all output and 
environmental characteristics. Many of these characteristics are therefore omitted from the 
cost function specifications. Moreover, there exist other omitted variables such as differences 
across companies in accounting procedures that are generally not taken into account.  
Unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity can be taken into account with conventional 
fixed or random effects in a panel data model. In order to distinguish external heterogeneities 
from cost efficiency, Greene (2005; 2004) proposed an approach that integrates an additional 
stochastic term representing inefficiency in both fixed and random effects models.6 These 
models assume that the firm-specific heterogeneity does not change over time but sources of 
inefficiency vary both across firms and over time. In this paper we use a ‘true random-effects’ 
model, which is a random-constant frontier model, obtained by combining a conventional 
random-effects model with a skewed stochastic term representing inefficiency. The extended 
model includes separate stochastic terms for latent heterogeneity and inefficiency. Since many 
of the unobserved factors, especially those related to the network’s shape, are likely to be 
correlated with the output and perhaps other explanatory variables, the random-effect 
estimators of the cost function coefficients could be biased. To overcome this shortcoming, 
the ‘true random-effects’ model has been adjusted using Mundlak’s (1978) formulation.7  
The empirical results obtained from true random effects models in a variety of 
applications suggest that modeling unobserved heterogeneity could significantly decrease the 
inefficiency estimates.8 This could lend certain support to the application of benchmarking 
methods in the regulation of strongly heterogeneous network industries, in which the 
                                                          
6 Kumbhakar (1991) proposed a similar approach using a three-stage estimation procedure. See also Heshmati 
and Kumbhakar (1994) and Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1995) for two applications of this model.  
7 See Farsi, Filippini, Kuenzle (2003) for a discussion of Mundlak’s adjustment in frontier models. 
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conventional inefficiency estimates appear to be overstated. Provided that they can 
sufficiently control for the unobserved heterogeneity across firms, these methods can be used 
to estimate an order of magnitude of cost-inefficiency in the sector or individual companies. 
In addition, in the case of the Swiss regional railway sector, such analyses could be used to 
evaluate the subsidies for transport services. 
The purpose of this paper is to study the potential advantages of these extended models 
in an application to Switzerland’s railway companies. In particular, our eventual interest is in 
models that can exploit the advantage of a fixed-effects model to have an unbiased estimate of 
the cost function without compromising the estimates of inefficiency scores. The models are 
estimated for a sample of 50 railway companies operating in Switzerland from 1985 to 1997. 
The alternative models are compared regarding the cost function slopes and inefficiency 
estimates. The conventional FE estimators of the cost function coefficients are assumed to be 
unbiased, thus used as a benchmark to which other models are compared. For the inefficiency 
estimates, the correlation between different models and the effect of econometric specification 
have been analyzed. The results suggest that the inefficiency estimates are substantially lower 
when the unobserved firm-specific effects are taken into account.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 respectively present the 
model specification and the methodology. The data are explained in section 4. Section 5 
presents the estimation results and discusses their implications, and section 5 provides the 
conclusions. 
 
2. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
A railway company can be considered as an aggregate production unit that operates in a 
given network and transforms labor, capital and energy inputs into units of transport services 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
8 See for instance Greene (2004), Farsi, Filippini and Kuenzle (2003) and Alvarez, Arias and Greene (2004). 
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such as passenger-kilometers of public transport and ton-kilometers of freight. Given the 
extremely large number of different transport services, the measure of output requires an 
aggregation of outputs in one way or another.9 The commonly used measures of output are 
the number of passenger-kilometers and freight ton-kilometers (Caves et al. 1985; Cantos et 
al. 1999) and number of wagon-kilometers (Filippini and Maggi 1993; Todani 2001).  
A practical way of attenuating the approximation errors due to aggregation is to include 
output characteristics such as network length or average haul in the model. Different 
strategies have been used in the literature. Caves et al. (1985) consider the average lengths of 
trip for freight and passengers and the number of route miles as output characteristics. 
Filippini and Maggi (1993) have included the network length in their model specification. 
Ivaldi and Mc Cullough (2001) and Todani (2001) considered three types of wagon-miles 
(high-valued, bulk and others) as three main outputs and accounted for average length of haul 
and the number of road miles as output characteristics. Other papers like Mizutani (2004) and 
Savage (1997) include additional output characteristics such as number of lines, load factor 
and station spacing. The empirical evidence suggests that all these characteristics could have 
significant effects on costs, therefore should be included in the cost model. However, in 
practice many of these variables are not available in which case more restricted models are 
used.  
Unfortunately, because of lack of sufficient data on many variables ordinarily used in 
the literature, in this paper we had a restricted choice of specification. We assumed a double-
output production process. The outputs are transported passengers measured by the total 
number of passenger-kilometers in a given year and  the transported freight measured as the 
aggregate number of ton-kilometers. The length of network is included in the model as output 
                                                          
9 Theoretically, any relation between any two points in the network could be defined as an output type. 
Estimating a multi-product cost function with so many outputs is practically impossible thus, an aggregation 
process is inevitable. 
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characteristics. Three input factors are considered: labor, capital and energy. A total cost 
function has been considered.10  
Based on the above specification the total cost frontier can be represented by the 
following cost function:  
( , , , , , , )K L E tTC f Y Q N P P P d=      (1), 
 
where TC is the total annual costs; Y and Q are the numbers of passenger-kilometers and ton-
kilometers respectively; PK , PL  and PE  are respectively the prices of capital, labor and 
energy; N is the length of network and dt is a vector including 12 year dummies from 1986 to 
1997 (year 1985 is the omitted category). The year dummies capture the cost changes 
associated with technical progress as well as other unobserved year-specific factors.11 
It is generally assumed that the cost function given in (1) is the result of cost 
minimization given input prices and output and should therefore satisfy certain properties.12 
Mainly, this function must be non-decreasing, concave, linearly homogeneous in input prices 
and non-decreasing in output. To estimate the cost function (1), a Cobb-Douglas (log-linear) 
functional form is employed. We also evaluated the possibility of applying a translog 
functional form that can account for variation of scale economies with output. However, we 
decided to exclude this model because it requires a relatively large number of parameters, 
                                                          
10 In a preliminary analysis we also estimated a variable cost function. However, the results indicate a positive 
derivative of the variable cost function with respect to the capital stock, which violates the non-increasing 
regularity condition. Following Guyomard and Vermersch (1989) and Filippini (1996) we believe that this 
problem is due to the empirical difficulty in defining the capital stock variable. Due to lack of data we have used 
a physical measure of the capital stock, which is highly correlated with output and gives rise to a multi-
collinearity problem. For this reason we preferred a total cost function, assuming that the companies can modify 
their capital expenses on a yearly basis. Insofar as this is equally applicable to all companies, the benchmarking 
analysis is not sensitive to such an assumption.  
11 In the cost function estimations it is common to use a linear trend for technical progress. However, our 
preliminary regressions indicated that the time-variation of costs is strongly non-linear. In fact there is a gradual 
increase in the beginning of the sample period followed by a decrease in costs. These variations can be explained 
by many unobserved factors (such as changes in collective labor contracts or seasonal composition of the 
demand) that change uniformly across companies. 
12 For more details on the functional form of the cost function see Cornes (1992,106). 
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which creates certain numerical problems in the simulated likelihood maximization for the 
random-constant model. Moreover, our preliminary estimations (not reported here) showed 
that this functional form resulted in counter-intuitive results for the sign of output variables. 
This is perhaps due to multicollinearity problems caused by strong correlation between the 
second order terms in translog form.  
The concavity assumption is automatically satisfied in Cobb-Douglas form. The linear 
homogeneity restriction can be imposed by normalizing the costs and prices by the price of 
one of the input factors. Here we considered the energy as the numeraire good. The other 
theoretical restrictions are verified after the estimation. The cost function can therefore be 
written as: 
0
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1986
ln( ) ln ln ln ln
ln ln
it
it it
it it
it
Y it Q it N it S it
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K L
K L t t i it
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= + + + +
+ + + + +∑
    (2) 
 
   with   i= 1, 2, ...., N   and    t = 1,2,…,Ti 
 
Subscripts i and t denote the company and year respectively, αi is a firm-specific effect and 
εit  is an iid error term. As we will explain in the next section, in the recent models proposed 
by Greene (2005), the stochastic term εit is composed of two parts: a skewed component 
representing inefficiency and a symmetric part for the random noise. 
The adopted specification given in (2) has two restrictions. First, as discussed earlier 
some output characteristics are omitted form the model. These omitted variables lower the 
statistical efficiency of the model by increasing the variance of the error components. 
Therefore, the inefficiency scores might be overestimated. The unobserved factors could also 
bias the estimation results should they be correlated with the explanatory variables. Secondly, 
as opposed to a flexible functional form like translog, the adopted Cobb-Douglas form does 
not allow for any second-order terms. The first implication is that the value of scale 
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economies is assumed to be constant regardless of the output level. Given that most of the 
Swiss regional railway companies are relatively small this assumption is not very restrictive. 
However, noting that the effects of second-order terms are suppressed into the error 
components, they could have a similar effect as that of the omitted variables explained above.  
In principle, some of the above shortcomings could be addressed by including the input 
factor demand (share) equations and solving the resulting system of equations with the 
appropriate cross-equation restrictions. However, combining these equations with a stochastic 
frontier model needs an econometric development, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The main problem is the fact that the allocative inefficiencies enter the demand equations, 
thus create a complex error structure (Greene 1997, 127). As Kumbhakar and Lovell have 
pointed out, a “satisfactory econometric specification” to such a system of equations “remains 
to be developed” (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000, 170). 
The discussed shortcomings should be considered in the light of this paper’s objective, 
which is focused on illustrating the application of alternative econometric models and 
evaluating their differences. In view of this fact and the practical difficulties explained above, 
we contend that the adopted specification is suitable for the purpose of this paper. However, 
we would like to stress that the estimated values reported here, of both cost efficiency and 
scale economies cannot be directly used for practical purposes. Rather, the estimation results 
can only be considered for illustrative purposes and qualitative comparison of different 
models.   
 
3. ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
Stochastic frontier models have been subject of a great body of literature resulting in a 
large number of econometric models to estimate cost functions. Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000) provide an extensive survey of this literature. The main models used in this paper are 
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based on Greene’s (2005) extension of the original frontier approach proposed by Aigner et 
al. (1977). In this framework, εit  as given in specification (2), is assumed to be a composite 
stochastic term with a normal-half-normal distribution, including both idiosyncratic effects 
and inefficiencies. The additional firm-specific term, αi in equation (2), represents the 
unobserved heterogeneity and is assumed to have a normal distribution. This model is referred 
to as a “true” random-effects model.13 The estimation method is based on simulated 
maximum likelihood.   
The results are compared with other alternative models such as the fixed-effects model 
proposed by Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and the random-effects model proposed by Pitt and 
Lee (1981). Both these models are covered by the general form given in (2) with the 
difference that in the former model αi is a fixed effect and εit  is a zero-mean error term with 
no distribution restriction, and in the latter (Pitt and Lee) model αi is a random effect with 
half-normal (or truncated normal) distribution and εit  is a normal random error term. 
A summary of the five models used in the paper is given in table 1. The first model is a 
fixed effects (FE) model. In this model the firm-specific effects are considered as constant 
parameters that can be correlated with the explanatory variables. The coefficients are 
estimated through “within-firm” variations and therefore, are not affected by heterogeneity 
bias.
14
 In the cost frontier literature the inefficiency scores are estimated as the distance from 
the firm with the minimum estimated fixed effect, that is }ˆmin{ˆ ii αα − , as proposed by Schmidt 
and Sickles (1984). 
 
                                                          
13 The name “true” is chosen to show that the model keeps the original frontier framework and the extension is 
done only by including an additional heterogeneity term.  
14 The term “heterogeneity bias” was used by Chamberlain (1982) for the bias due to correlation between 
individual effects and explanatory variables in a random-effects model. See also Baltagi (2001) for an extensive 
discussion of fixed-effects (within) estimators.  
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Table 1: Econometric specifications of the stochastic cost frontier 
 
 
Model I 
 
FE 
Model II 
 
RE 
Model III 
 
Pooled 
Model IV 
 
True RE 
Model V 
True RE with 
Mundlak 
adjustment 
Firm-
specific 
component 
αi 
Constant Half-normal N+(0, σα2) None N(0, σα
2) 
i i iXα γ δ= +  
1
1 iT
i it
i t
X X
T =
= ∑  
2~ N(0, )i δδ σ  
Random 
error εit iid (0, σε
2) iid (0, σε2) 
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uit~N+(0, σu2) 
vit~N(0, σv2) 
 
εit= uit+ vit 
uit~N+(0, σu2) 
vit~N(0, σv 2) 
 
εit= uit+ vit 
uit~N+(0, σu2) 
vit~N(0, σv 2) 
 
Inefficiency 
 
 
ˆ ˆmin{ }i iα α−  
 
 
1 2E , ,  ...i i iα ω ω⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
with it i itω α ε= +  
 
 
E it it itu u v⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦  
 
 
E it i itu α ε⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦  
 
 
E it i itu δ ε⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦  
 
 
 
 
Model II is a random effects (RE) model proposed by Pitt and Lee (1981), which is 
estimated using the maximum likelihood method. The firm’s inefficiency is estimated using 
the conditional mean of the inefficiency term proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982),15 that is: 
1 2E , ,  ... Ei i i i iα ω ω α ω⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤=⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  where it i itω α ε= +  and 
1
1 iT
i it
i tT
ω ω
=
= ∑ .   A limitation of this model is 
the assumption that the firm-specific stochastic term αi is uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables. Moreover, in both models (I and II), inefficiency indicators may include 
unobserved environmental factors, thus may overstate the firms’ inefficiency. There are 
however two factors that may exacerbate this problem in the FE model. First, unlike the RE 
model, the firm-specific effects do not follow a single distribution, thus can have a relatively 
wide range of variation. Secondly, these effects can be correlated with the explanatory 
variables, thus can also capture the heterogeneity factors that are correlated with the 
regressors. Whereas in the RE model in which the firm-specific effects are by construction 
                                                          
15 See also Greene (2002). 
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uncorrelated with the regressors, these factors are suppressed at least partially through the 
“between” variations, into the regression coefficients. 
In the first two models (I and II), the firm’s inefficiency is assumed to be constant over 
time, thus captured by the firm-specific effects, while in other models inefficiency can vary 
across years. Model III is a pooled frontier model in that the sample is considered as a cross-
section and its panel aspect is neglected. The random error term is divided into two 
components: a normal error term vit capturing the noise and a half-normal random term uit 
representing the inefficiency as a one-sided non-negative disturbance.  This model is based on 
the original cost frontier model proposed by Aigner et al. (1977). The firm’s inefficiency is 
estimated using the conditional mean of the inefficiency term E it it itu u v⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦ , proposed by 
Jondrow et al. (1982). 
Models IV and V are extensions to model III that include an additional firm-specific 
random effect (αi) to represent the unobserved heterogeneity among firms. Model IV is 
Greene’s (2005) true RE model.  In this model it is assumed that the unobserved cost 
differences across firms that remain constant over time, are driven by network-related 
unobserved characteristics rather than inefficiency. Given the relatively long period covered 
in the data (12 years on average), this is a realistic assumption. The inefficiency term is 
assumed to be an iid random variable with half-normal distribution. This implies that the 
inefficiency is not persistent and each period brings about new idiosyncratic elements thus 
new sources of inefficiency. This is a reasonable assumption particularly in industries that are 
constantly facing new technologies. Therefore there are two justifications for such a 
specification in network industries: The first one is a practical assumption that persistent cost 
differences are related to unobserved heterogeneity across networks and the second one is 
based on the conjecture that the sources of inefficiency in network industries are dominated 
by new technology shocks and the incomplete adaptation of managers facing them.  
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Model V is an extension of model IV that uses Mundlak’s (1978) specification to 
account for the potential correlation of unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity with the 
explanatory variables. Mundlak’s adjustment (Hsiao 2003, 44-46) can be written as an 
auxiliary regression given by:  
i i iXα γ δ= +   
1
1 iT
i it
i t
X X
T =
= ∑ , 2~ (0, )i N δδ σ      (3), 
where Xit is the vector of all explanatory variables and γ is the corresponding vector of 
coefficients. Equation (3) actually divides the firm-specific stochastic term into two 
components: The first part can be explained by exogenous variables, whereas the remaining 
component (δi) is orthogonal to explanatory variables. The advantage of this model is that it 
allows for a time-variant inefficiency term while minimizing the heterogeneity bias. The 
heterogeneity bias can be avoided to the extent that the auxiliary equation can capture the 
correlations.  
In our comparative analysis we consider two aspects of the models’ performance. The 
first dimension is the estimation of the cost function’s coefficients.  In railway companies the 
operating costs are affected by network characteristics, which may be correlated with 
explanatory variables such as network’s size and input factor prices. For instance, larger 
networks are more likely to have more complex shapes. Denser networks are usually located 
in areas with higher population density, where wages are relatively high. Such relationships 
imply a positive correlation between the output level and labor price with the network 
complexity, which is not fully captured by the included factors in the model. The Hausman 
test is used to confirm that the firm-specific effects are correlated with the explanatory 
variables. In this case the FE estimators (model I) are unbiased, thus provide a benchmark to 
which other models can be compared.  
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The second aspect of the models’ performance concerns the inefficiency estimates. It is 
important to note that the consistency of slopes (coefficients) does not necessarily imply that 
inefficiency estimates are unbiased. Interestingly, the empirical results suggest that there is a 
trade-off in estimations. Namely, models (like the FE model) with a good performance on 
slopes have strongly biased inefficiency estimates. Roughly speaking, the heterogeneity bias 
may be suppressed into the slopes as it appears in the RE model, or into the efficiency 
estimates as observed in the FE model. Farsi et al. (2005) provide a discussion on this issue. 
The results of that study on a sample of nursing homes suggest that Mundlak’s formulation 
can be helpful to reduce the heterogeneity bias in both slopes and inefficiency estimates at the 
same time. In this paper we use a similar approach to study if such a conclusion can be 
applied to a network industry.  
It should be noted that the inefficiency estimation requires a certain interpretation of the 
stochastic terms in the model. In the frontier literature, starting from Aigner et al. (1977), it is 
commonly accepted that the skewed stochastic term with a certain distribution represents 
inefficiency. Carree (2002) discusses some of the implications of such distribution 
assumptions. For instance a half-normal distribution through its zero mode, implies that any 
company is most likely to be completely efficient. Moreover, implicit in this model is the 
assumption that inefficiency is uncorrelated with all exogenous variables and also with the 
idiosyncratic variations reflected in the symmetric error term.
16
 In fact, through this 
assumption all the inefficiencies that are somehow related to exogenous variables such as 
factor prices and output are excluded from the firm’s productive inefficiency. Later studies 
like Cornwell et al. (1990) and Battese and Coelli (1992) extended the original framework to 
include exogenous variables in the distribution of the inefficiency term. However, in this 
paper we maintain the original assumption such that the efficiency measures are restricted to 
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the sources that are completely uncorrelated with all exogenous variables, which by definition 
are beyond the firm’s control. The only exception is the FE model (model I) that allows any 
correlation of inefficiency scores. Furthermore, we assume that the inefficiency can vary over 
time, thus for the inefficiency estimates we focus on models III, IV and V. 
 
4. DATA 
The data set used in this paper is extracted from the annual reports of the Swiss Federal 
Office of Statistics on public transport companies. The companies operating in main urban 
centers are excluded from the sample. Most of these companies operate inner-city tramways 
and buses, whose functioning is quite different from trains. We also excluded one other 
company whose extremely low total costs and energy expenses suggest the possibility of a 
reporting error. The final sample includes 50 railway companies over a 13-year period from 
1985 to 1997. The sample is an unbalanced panel with number of periods (Ti) varying from 1 
to 13 and with 45 companies with 12 or 13 years, resulting in 605 observations in total.17 The 
available information for any given year includes total costs, labor and energy expenses 
separately, total number of employees, the quantity of consumed electricity, network length, 
total number of seats and  total number of train-kilometers, passenger-kilometers and ton-
kilometers.  
Capital costs are calculated as the residual costs after deducting the labor and energy 
expenses from the total costs. These costs are mainly related to equipment and materials. 
Total number of seats is used as a proxy for capital stock.18 Thus, the capital price is 
calculated as the residual expenses per seat. The passenger and freight outputs are 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
16 Here, cost inefficiency is defined as the excess costs due to the firm’s technical problems or to suboptimal 
allocation of resources. Thus, scale inefficiencies, which are related to suboptimal output, are excluded.  
17 The average number of periods in the sample is 12 years. For 37 companies, the data are available for 13 
years. Eight other companies have 12 years available. The number of years available for the remaining five 
companies is respectively 1, 3, 7, 7 and 10.  
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respectively measured by the number of passenger-kilometers and ton-kilometers. In 
Switzerland, each railway company is required to run a certain minimum number of trips per 
day for any given connection, specified by the cantonal regulators. Therefore, the number of 
train-kilometers or wagon-kilometers could be also an appropriate measure of passenger 
output. However, in order to be consistent with the recent literature19 and also given that there 
is a high correlation between train-kilometers and passenger-kilometers (a correlation 
coefficient of 0.97 in our sample) we adopted the number of passenger-kilometers and ton-
kilometers. All the costs and prices are adjusted for inflation using the Switzerland’s global 
price index and are measured in 1997 Swiss Francs.   
Table 2 provides a descriptive summary of the main variables used in the analysis. As it 
can be seen in this table, the total costs show a high variation in the sample. The average cost 
of a passenger-kilometer varies from 0.3 to about 6 Swiss Francs. There is also a considerable 
variation in input prices and both outputs in the sample. Given the importance of within 
variations in most panel data models (especially the fixed-effect model), it is helpful to 
distinguish these variations from the variations across companies. Table 3 gives a summary of 
“within” and “between” variations for the main variables used in the regressions. As it can be 
seen in this table, the dependent variable and most explanatory variables show a fairly 
considerable amount of within variation, supporting the use of a fixed-effect model. As 
expected, the within variation of network length is relatively low (limited to 7 percent).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
18 See Filippini and Prioni (2003) for a similar approach. 
19 Some recent examples are Mancuso and Reverberi (2003), Estache et al. (2002), Cantos et al. (1999) and 
Banos-Pino et al. (2002).   
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics (605 observations) 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation Median Min. Max. 
Total annual costs 
(TC) CHF million  26.73 49.88 8.83 2.12 307.43 
 
Passenger output (Y) 
×106 passenger-kms 30.80 55.10 10.00 0.41 311.00 
 
Average cost (CHF 
per passenger-km) 1.20 0.76 1.09 0.33 5.98 
 
Freight output (Q)  
×106 ton-kilometers 10.20 52.70 0.27 0.00015 477.00 
 
Network length (N) 
(km) 39.43 56.64 22.82 3.90 377.00 
 
Capital price (PK) per 
seat (CHF '000) 4.53 2.13 4.03 1.04 14.47 
 
Average labor price 
(PL) per employee 
per year (CHF '000) 86.05 6.48 86.09 60.93 104.93 
 
Energy (electricity) 
price (PE) CHF/ kWh 0.157 0.023 0.158 0.076 0.265 
      
 
 
- All monetary values are in 1997 Swiss Francs (CHF), adjusted for inflation by Switzerland’s 
global consumer price index. 
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Table 3: Within and between variations (50 companies and 12 years on average) 
 
Standard Deviation  Mean Overall Between Within 
Fraction of 
within variation 
ln
E
TC
P
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 11.31 1.10 1.12 0.15 0.14 
 
ln (Y)  16.32 1.34 1.34 0.12 0.09 
 
ln (Q)  12.49 2.72 2.78 0.61 0.22 
 
ln (N) 3.20 0.91 0.93 0.06 0.07 
ln K
E
P
P
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  10.18 0.44 0.39 0.19 0.43 
ln L
E
P
P
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 13.22 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.62 
      
 
- For each variable (X) the between standard deviation is based on companies’ average values that 
is: 
1
1 iT
i it
i t
X X
T =
= ∑ ; and the within standard deviation is based on deviations from companies’ 
averages ( it iX X− ). The overall and within statistics are calculated over 605 company-years 
and the between statistics are calculated over 50 companies. The fraction of within variation is 
calculated as the ratio of within to overall standard deviation. 
 
 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The estimation results for the five models are given in table 4. These results show that 
the output and input price coefficients are positive and highly significant across all models. 
The estimated coefficients show a considerable variation across different models. The 
estimates from the pooled model (III) are particularly different from those of other models. 
The year dummies are mostly significant and suggest that the cost variation over time is not 
linear. Again, the pooled model is an exception in which none of these dummies show any 
statistically significant effect. Noting that model III completely ignores the panel structure of 
the data, its estimates are likely to be strongly biased by omitted firm-specific variables. On 
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the other hand the fixed-effects estimators (model I) are derived from the within-firm 
variations and thus unbiased.   
The year dummy coefficients (excluding model III) show that the total costs of railway 
companies rose almost linearly from 1985 to 1992 with an average annual growth rate of 
about 1.6%, but declined after 1992 with an average rate of about 1.5% per year. Since total 
costs and all the continuous explanatory variables are in logarithms, the estimated coefficients 
can be interpreted as average cost elasticities. For instance, the output coefficients suggest that 
on average a one percent increase in passenger-kilometers will increase the costs by 0.11 to 
0.49 percent depending on the adopted specification. The marginal effect of ton-kilometers is 
about 10 times lower, suggesting substantially lower variable costs for freight transportation. 
The coefficient of network length indicates that the marginal cost of a one percent extension 
in the network keeping the output constant, is approximately equivalent to 0.4 percent 
increase in costs. These results are consistent with the previous empirical results regarding 
Switzerland’s railroad industry (Filippini and Maggi 1993) in that they suggest increasing 
returns to scale.  
Table 4 also indicates that if the pooled model is set aside, the input price coefficients do 
not vary significantly across different models. The coefficient of labor price, varying between 
.55 and .57 (bar model III), is actually comparable to the average share of labor expenses, 
which is about 52% in the sample. The capital price coefficient varies between .31 and .32 
(model III excluded), which is considerably below the average share of capital costs in the 
sample (44%). This result may suggest that the companies are not so responsive as a 
constantly cost minimizing behavior should be, to the changes in capital prices. This can be 
explained by the fact that in the short run railway companies cannot vary much of their capital 
stock such as equipment and machinery.  
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Table 4: Regression results 
 
 Model I FE 
Model II 
RE 
Model III 
Pooled 
Model IV 
True RE 
Model V 
True RE + 
Mundlak 
αY .114* 
(.032) 
.200* 
(.030) 
.492* 
(.015) 
.133* 
(.023) 
.106* 
(.034) 
αQ .014* 
(.006) 
.021* 
(.003) 
.030* 
(.006) 
.038* 
(.004) 
.017* 
(.003) 
αN .448* 
(.051) 
.485* 
(.039) 
.393* 
(.026) 
.432* 
(.015) 
.488* 
(.035) 
αK .318* 
(.017) 
.310* 
(.010) 
.171* 
(.032) 
.312* 
(.008) 
.315* 
(.009) 
αL .546* 
(.037) 
.548* 
(.029) 
.592* 
(.074) 
.568* 
(.036) 
.562* 
(.034) 
γY _ _ _ _ .159* 
(.050) 
γQ _ _ _ _ .090* 
(.013) 
γN _ _ _ _ -.150* 
(.056) 
γK _ _ _ _ -.189* 
(.067) 
γL _ _ _ _ -.193 
(.180) 
α1986 .010 (.015) .009 (.041) .009 (.056) .022 (.027) .017 (.035) 
α1987 .020 (.015) .012 (.031) .003 (.056) .032 (.025) .029 (.031) 
α1988 .039* (.015) .028 (.044) .010 (.057) .051 (.037) .049 (.050) 
α1989 .065* (.016) .052 (.046) .036 (.057) .076* (.033) .074 (.050) 
α1990 .084* (.016) .068 (.036) .024 (.058) .097* (.034) .94* (.044) 
α1991 .098* (.017) .078* (.029) .030 (.058) .114* (.028) .111* (.035) 
α1992 .111* (.017) .094* (.034) .046 (.058) .130* (.026) .122* (.034) 
α1993 .100* (.017) .081* (.034) .015 (.057) .119* (.026) .112* (.034) 
α1994 .082* (.017) .063 (.040) -.001 (.056) .103* (.037) .093* (.039) 
α1995 .059* (.016) .048 (.032) .019 (.057) .081* (.023) .064 (.034) 
α1996 .037* (.017) .028 (.024) .027 (.057) .066* (.022) .043 (.025) 
α1997 .038* (.018) .030 (.032) .019 (.060) .063 (.039) .042 (.032) 
α0 _ -4.90* 
(.57) 
-8.31* 
(.98) 
-3.89* 
(.51) 
-1.89 
(2.66) 
σα _ _ _ .783* 
(.027) 
.751* 
(.058) 
2 2
u vσ σ σ= +   _ 
.807* 
(.14) 
.464* 
(.001) 
.109* 
(.005) 
.095* 
(.005) 
u vλ σ σ=  _ 
 
11.37* 
(3.81) 
2.88* 
(.30) 
2.58* 
(.56) 
1.59* 
(.031) 
 
 
- Standard errors are given in brackets. *  means significant at less than 5%. 
- The sample includes 605 observations (50 railway companies). 
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Comparing the results from different models in table 4 shows that all models except 
model III, have reasonably comparable coefficients. In model III (pooled model) variations 
over time and within firms are treated exactly similar to those between different firms. 
Moreover, the unobserved firm-specific effects are completely neglected, which may bias the 
estimations. A Lagrange Multiplier test on an OLS model strongly rejects the hypothesis that 
the residuals of a given company are uncorrelated (test statistic of 2990 for a chi-square with 
1 degree of freedom), suggesting that the pooled model is mis-specified.  Moreover, the 
Hausman test rejects the hypothesis that the firm-specific effects are uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables (test statistic of 61.5 for a chi-square with 17 degrees of freedom). This 
result suggests that models that do not account for these correlations can give biased results. 
Given the relatively high number of periods (on average 12 years) and the reasonable within-
company variations (see table 3) in the sample, the fixed effects model’s results can be 
considered as unbiased estimates of the cost function parameters. Therefore, the coefficients 
estimated from model I are used as a benchmark for assessing the potential heterogeneity bias 
in other models.  
Compared to model I, the parameter estimates in the pooled model (III) have the highest 
differences. The estimated coefficients in the remaining models are fairly close to those of the 
FE model, suggesting that heterogeneity biases in the coefficients are not substantial. This 
statement does not apply to the inefficiency estimates, which as we will see later, show 
considerable biases. As seen in table 4, there is no clear distinction between models II and IV 
concerning the heterogeneity biases. While in certain coefficients model IV is closer to the 
unbiased estimates (model I), in some others model II shows a ‘better’ performance.  
The random effects specification in both models II and IV has however a shortcoming in 
that the firm-specific heterogeneity terms (ui in model II and αi in model IV) are assumed to 
be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. If we put any trust in the Hausman 
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specification test, this assumption is not realistic. Moreover, as discussed earlier, it is 
plausible that some of the unobserved network characteristics be correlated with the network 
length. Such correlations are taken into account in model V through the auxiliary coefficients 
(γx). The results in table 4 indicate that model V shows the smallest differences with the 
unbiased estimators of model I. This suggests that applying Mundlak’s (1978) adjustment to 
the TRE model (model IV) can decrease the heterogeneity biases. As shown in the table, the 
auxiliary coefficients (γx) are all significant. These coefficients can be interpreted as the 
correlation effect between the unobserved firm characteristics and the corresponding 
explanatory variable. For instance, the positive signs of γY and γQ suggest that keeping all 
observed factors fixed, networks with higher outputs are more likely to belong to the ‘high-
cost’ or ‘difficult’ networks; and the negative signs of γN, γK and γL suggest that larger 
networks and companies that have higher input prices are more likely to be in the ‘low-cost’ 
category.  
Table 5 provides a descriptive summary of the inefficiency estimates from different 
models (see table 1, last row). These estimates represent the relative excess cost of a given 
firm compare to a minimum level that would have been achieved if the firm had operated as 
efficiently as the ‘best practice’ observed in the sample. In comparing different models it 
should be noted that in the first two models (I and II), the inefficiency is assumed to be 
constant over time. Moreover, in these models all the unobserved firm-specific differences are 
interpreted as inefficiency. As expected, both models I and II, especially the FE model, 
predict rather unrealistic inefficiency scores averaging about .7 to .8 and up to a maximum of 
2 to 2.5. According to these models, a typical company can save about a third of its costs by a 
more efficient allocation of resources. These high values indicate that the heterogeneity across 
companies is an important driver of cost differences and that neglecting it may create a 
substantial upward bias in inefficiency scores.      
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Table 5: Inefficiency measures 
 
 Model I FE 
Model II 
RE  
Model III 
Pooled 
Model IV 
True RE 
Model V 
True RE 
with 
Mundlak 
Mean 0.813 0.696 0.343 0.078 0.063 
Median 0.676 0.662 0.289 0.061 0.053 
Maximum 2.507 1.992 0.848 0.386 0.311 
95 percentile 1.723 1.470 0.848 0.187 0.134 
Minimum 0.000 0.160 0.060 0.011 0.012 
N 605 605 605 605 605 
 
In model III the inefficiency estimates are in a more realistic range, with an average of 
.34 and a maximum value of .85. These values though still too high to be convincing, are 
substantially lower than those predicted by models I and II; and this despite the fact that the 
pooled model (III) does not account for unobserved heterogeneity. This attenuation of 
inefficiency estimates can be explained by the structure of the inefficiency term in model III. 
Given that the inefficiency term (uit) is assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed over time and across companies, it cannot fully capture the firm-specific 
differences that are time-invariant, thus such differences are partly suppressed into and bias 
the model’s coefficients.  
Both models IV and V, which have separate stochastic terms for inefficiency and firm-
specific heterogeneity, have quite reasonable inefficiency estimates about 6 to 8 percent on 
average and 31 to 38 percent on maximum. The substantial decrease in these values compared 
to other models, suggests that these models can separate to a considerable extent, the 
heterogeneity from the inefficiency. To understand the reasons behind these results, it is 
helpful to note that the sole difference between models III and IV is that model IV includes an 
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additional firm-specific random term (αi). This term represents the variations across firms, 
which are about 7 times larger than the variation within firms (compare σα to σ in the lower 
panel of table 4).  
Given that the unobserved heterogeneity is potentially correlated with the explanatory 
variables and that these correlations are not taken into account in model IV the resulting 
inefficiency scores may capture some of these differences. This issue can be explored by 
comparing models IV and V. In model V the time-invariant cost differences across companies 
are separated from inefficiency estimates (as in model IV). In addition, the possible 
correlations with explanatory variables are mitigated through auxiliary coefficients. The 
results in table 5 show that when such correlations are controlled for (model V), the 
inefficiency estimates slightly decline (by about .015 on average and by .075 on maximum). 
According to this model the average (median) company is only 6.3 (5.3) percent inefficient, 
and the maximum inefficiency in 95 percent of the sample is limited to 13.4 percent. These 
results suggest that model V not only provides unbiased, or close to unbiased, estimates of the 
cost function’s coefficients, it can also better separate the heterogeneity from inefficiency. 
The pair-wise correlation coefficients between the inefficiency estimates from different 
models are listed in table 6. In order for the correlation coefficients to be comparable, they are 
calculated at the firm level using 50 observations (one observation for each firm). Namely, in 
models with time-variant efficiency, the inefficiency score is calculated as the firm’s average 
inefficiency score over the sample period. For models with time-variant inefficiency the 
correlation coefficients are also given over the 605 observations.  
As shown in table 6, models I and II, and models IV and V show a relatively high 
correlation.20 However, except a few cases the correlation coefficients are quite low, 
                                                          
20 These results are consistent with Farsi et al. (2005) who used a similar method for a sample of nursing homes. 
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suggesting substantial differences across models.21 Especially, models IV and V show a 
negative correlation with all other models. Given that the correlation coefficients are 
calculated on company-average inefficiency scores, the weak (and negative) correlations may 
suggest that the inefficiency estimates vary considerably from one year to another, in which 
case the correlation between models with constant and time-variant inefficiency should be 
weak. However, this can only partly explain the observed correlations. In fact the positive and 
fairly strong correlation between the pooled model III (with time-variant efficiency) and both 
models I and II (with time-invariant efficiency) indicates that averaging cannot explain the 
negative correlations.  
 
Table 6: Pair-wise correlation between inefficiency estimates  
 
 Model I FE 
Model II 
RE 
Model III 
Pooled 
Model IV 
True RE 
Model V 
True RE 
with 
Mundlak 
Model I 1     
Model II .932* 1    
Model III .497* .614* 1   
Model IV -.247 -.256 -.158   [.092*] 1  
Model V -.334* -.320* -.197   [.105*] 
.948* 
 [.971*] 1 
 
- The correlation coefficients have been estimated over the firms (50 observations) that is, average 
values over the sample period are used in models with time-variant inefficiency (III, IV and V). 
- Correlation coefficients based on 605 observations are given in brackets.  
- *  significant at 5%. 
 
The negative correlation coefficients (table 6) point to a striking distinction between the 
models IV and V and all other models, which do not distinguish unobserved heterogeneity 
from inefficiency. The negative correlations manifest especially in model V in which the 
                                                          
21 The rank correlations show similar patterns. These results are omitted to avoid repetition. 
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correlations with observed factors are taken into account. These values suggest that some of 
the unobserved network characteristics may actually be negatively correlated with company’s 
average inefficiency. One interpretation is that the relatively complex thus costly networks are 
more likely to be operated by an efficient management. This is a plausible explanation 
because the companies with complex networks are more likely to have a general awareness 
and perhaps the required expertise for technical problems. Such expertise can directly or 
indirectly contribute to the firm’s efficiency. The results in table 6 highlight the importance of 
unobserved heterogeneity, as failure to account for such factors can result in a completely 
misleading and even reverse picture of inefficiencies.  
The estimation of a cost function enables us to derive important characteristics of the 
supply technology such as economies of density and scale. In line with Caves et al. (1985), 
the economies of density are defined as the inverse of the elasticity of costs with respect to 
outputs that is, the relative increase in total cost resulting from an increase in outputs, holding 
all input prices and the network size constant: 
 1
ln ln
ln ln
ED
TC TC
Y Q
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
=
+
. (4) 
Economies of density exist if the above expression (ED) has a value greater than one. For 
values of ED below one, we identify diseconomies of density. In the case of ED = 1, the 
company’s output minimizes its costs given the network’s size.  
Slightly different is the definition of economies of scale (ES).22 Here, the increase in 
total costs is brought about by an increase in company’s scale that is in both outputs and the 
network size, holding the factor prices constant. The commonly used definition is the one 
                                                          
22 It should be noted that the adopted definitions of scale and density economies do not necessarily correspond 
to those based on the production function. In fact, only in homothetic production functions, where the optimal 
input bundles vary proportionately, the two definitions are equivalent. In this paper, we do not impose 
proposed by Caves et 
size and the outputs wi
Similarly, economies o
and density economies
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ignoring the unobserved firm-specific effects can bias the estimated coefficients. In fact such 
biases are driven by possible correlation of unobserved effects with output and network 
length. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The most relevant measure included in the railway reform of 1996 is the change from 
the practice of ex-post deficit coverage to an ex-ante fixed payment system for transport 
services. In this context cost frontier models could be useful in determining the amount of 
subsidies granted to the regional railway companies. Moreover, such models could be used for 
benchmarking analyses aimed at inducing productive efficiency among railway companies. 
Such applications are however hampered in practice partly because of the strong unobserved 
heterogeneity in railway networks, which might be confounded with the company’s 
inefficiency. This paper casts some light on the performance of different cost frontier models 
in presence of unobserved heterogeneity.  
Alternative cost frontier models applied to a panel of Swiss railway companies indicate 
that the estimations particularly the inefficiency estimates, are sensitive to the adopted 
specification. The data show a considerable unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity that is 
likely to be correlated with explanatory variables.  In such cases unbiased coefficients can be 
obtained from the fixed effects model. This model’s estimates of inefficiency are however 
unrealistic. In fact, comparing the results across different models suggest that the inefficiency 
estimates largely depend upon how the unobserved heterogeneity across firms is specified. 
Panel data models such as Pitt and Lee (1981) and Schmidt and Sickles (1984) that do not 
distinguish between unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity and inefficiency can overestimate 
the overall inefficiencies or even give misleading patterns of inefficiency. The cost frontier 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
economies as the inverse of the corresponding cost elasticities. See Chambers (1988) for more details.  
 29
random effects model labeled as ‘true’ random-effects model (Greene, 2005) provides 
reasonable estimates of inefficiency suggesting that the inefficiency estimates in other models 
could be confounded with unobserved heterogeneity. However, the problem of this model is 
that because of potential correlation between heterogeneity and explanatory variables, the cost 
function coefficients may be biased (heterogeneity bias), especially as the Hausman 
specification test confirms the presence of such correlations. 
An auxiliary equation in line with Mundlak (1978) can be helpful in this regard. This 
adjustment has been applied to the ‘true’ random effects. The resulted specification shows a 
very low level of heterogeneity bias, while slightly reducing the inefficiency estimates. The 
high correlation between the inefficiency scores across the two models suggests that in so far 
as the heterogeneity is accounted for, the correlation between heterogeneity and explanatory 
variables does not considerably affect the inefficiency estimates.  
From a policy point of view, this study suggests that the Mundlak version of the “true” 
random effects model is a promising technique that could be used in regulation of railway 
networks. While emphasizing that a mechanical use of any of these models could be 
misleading, we contend that cost frontier models can be used as a complementary control 
instrument in benchmarking and evaluation of subsidy requests in the Swiss Regional 
Railways. For instance, as shown by Farsi and Filippini (2004) for the case of electricity 
networks, the regulator could use these models to predict a confidence interval for the costs of 
each one of the firms. Acceptable intervals for revenue and price caps can be calculated 
accordingly. Using such predictions along with other monitoring instruments, the regulator 
can hold the companies within a reasonably well-predicted range of cost-efficiency.   
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